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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
H. E. COL WELL and EDITH 
C:. COLWELL, his wife, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
UPPER CANAL IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Defendant 
t;PPER CANAL IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, and MARVIN G. JENSON, 
OSCAR HANSON, JR., and PHILIP 
R. BLOMQUIST, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11390 
This is an action brought by the Upper Canal 
C:nrnpany as a third-party plaintiff to recover dam-
<lgt>~ and injunctive relief against Salt Lake County 
llll the theory that the county is liable to the plaintiffs, 
H. E. Cohvell and Edith C. Colwell, his wife, for any 
and all damages which they have sustained. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvYER COURT 
The trial judge, Stewart M. Hanson, granted the 
motion of the Upper Canal to file its third-party com-
plaint against Salt Lake County and the individual 
commissioners for the said county. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The third-party defendants ask that the ruling 
of the trial judge be reversed and the motion of the 
Upper Canal to file its third-party complaint be 
denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 19, 1968, the plaintiffs, Col wells, 
filed their complaint asking for $3,000.00 com-
pensatory damages and also for a permanent injunc-
tion against the defendant, Upper Canal Inigation 
Company. [R.1 J The complaint alleged that the 
Upper Canal was negligent in ( 1 ) Failing to properly 
construct their canal facilities, ( 2) failing to main-
tain their canal facilities, and ( 3) By allowing too 
much vvater to enter said canal. [R.1 tf4] 
On August 8, 1968, the Upper Canal filed a thircl-
party complaint against Salt Lake County, Marvin G. 
Jenson, Oscar Hanson, Jr. and Philip R. Blomquist as 
the duly elected commissioners for the county. [ R. 5 l 
Paragraph 8 of the said third-party complaint allege~ 
that: 
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'' ... if the property of H. E. Colwell and Edith 
C. Colwell, his wife, has been damaged as 
alleged and set forth in their complaint, such 
damage has been solely and proximately 
caused by the third-party defendants herein 
by the use of said Upper Canal as a storm 
drainage of waters from the streets and roads 
owned by Salt Lake County ... " [R.7J 
On August 8, 1968, the Upper Canal also filed an 
answer and counterclaim to the plaintiffs' complaint. 
rR.11 J The answer alleged that Salt Lake County is 
'olely liable to the plaintiffs for any damage the 
plaintiffs have sustained. [R.12] The counterclaim 
alleged that the plaintiffs had caused their own dam-
ages by building a fence and further encroaching 
upon the easement belonging to the Upper Canal 
Company. CR.13] 
On August 15, 1968, the third-party defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint 
lR.26J, and also a notice of motion. [R.24] This 
motion was heard on August 20, 1968, before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, at which time the 
Upper Canal asked leave to amend its complaint. 
[ H.'.28 J The trial judge granted permission to do so. 
On September 4, 1968, an amended third-party 
complaint was filed. [R.32] This time the Upper 
Caual Company alleged that Salt Lake County was 
licible to the Upper Canal Company for all their 
clcunages. [R.34 tf8 J No change was made in the 
original answer which raised as an affirmative 
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defense that Salt Lake County was solely liable to 
the plaintiffs for their damages. [ R.11 ] 
Thereafter on September 6, 1968, Salt Lake 
County and the individual commissioners filed a 
motion to dismiss the amended third-party complaint 
[ R.39] ; and at the same time they filed their notice 
of motion. [R.37] 
On September 10, 1968, a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson and on September 
16, 1968, an order was signed denying the third-party 
defendants' motion to dismiss. [R.41] 
On October 4, 1968, the said third-party defend-
ants filed their petition for an intermediate appeal 
with the Supreme Court [R.47]; and the said petition 
was granted on October 17, 1968. [R.46] 
POINT I 
RULE 14 OF THE UT AH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE UPPER 
CANAL TO FILE ITS AMENDED THIRD-PARTY 
COl\1PLAINT AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND/OR THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS 
THEREOF BASED UPON THE PRESENT ALLEGA-
TIONS IN THE SAID THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT. 
The original complaint filed in this case is an 
action in tort in which the plaintiffs as property mYn-
ers claim $3,000.00 compensatory damages as \Ydl as 
an injunction against the Upper Canal. The basis 
for their relief is set out in paragraph 4 "'·herein the 
plaintiffs allege that the defendant 
" ... failed to properly construct and has failed 
to properly maintain said canal and defendant 
has allowed too much water to enter said 
canal and that by reason of the foregoing acts 
of defendant the waters of said canal have from 
time to time escaped from the canal and have 
flowed over and upon the said lands of the 
plaintiff ... " [R.1 tf4J 
lt is obvious that the property owners are alleging 
negligence against the Upper Canal Company for 
three ( 3) reasons, to-wit: ( 1) Failure to properly con-
struct the canal, (2) Failure to properly maintain the 
canal, and ( 3) Allowing too much water to enter 
said canal. 
The essence of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of 
the third-party complaint filed by the Upper Canal 
is that Salt Lake County is responsible for the water 
tlrn tis in the Upper Canal and that consequently Salt 
Lake County is liable to the property owners for any 
damages which they have sustained and that the 
Upper Canal is not liable in any way. The answer 
also places the liability on Salt Lake County. By 
attempting to shift the blame over to the third-party 
defendants and by saying that they are liable to the 
plaintiffs for all of their damages, the said Upper 
Curnl has misconstrned the use of Rule 14. 
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Rule 14 (a) as amended in 1963 reads in part as 
follows: 
"(a) When defendant may bring in third 
party. At any time after commencement of 
the action a defendant, as a third-party plain-
tiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be 
served upon a person not a party to the action 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part 
of the plaintiffs claim against him ... " 
It is clear that the rule can be used only when the 
third-party defendants are liable to the third-party 
plaintiffs. It is obvious that it has no application 
when the allegations are that the third-party defend-
ants are liable to the original plaintiffs in the action 
rather than to the third-party plaintiffs. [ 3 Moore's 
Federal Practice 574, §14.11 "Impleader of Joint Tort-
Feasor." See note 17J The original complaint stated 
that the third-party defendants were liable to the 
plaintiffs for their damages. It is true that in the 
amended third-party complaint the Upper Canal 
Company attempts to draft its language to allege 
some liability on the part of Salt Lake County to the 
Upper Canal Irrigation Company. However, the 
essential allegations of the amended complaint 
remoin the same as those in the original comploint 
and the affirmative defense in the answer alleging 
Solt Lake County was the party responsible to thr 
plaintiffs for their dmnages was not changed. 
In the case of Hardman v. "l\1athews, et al, 1 Ut. 
6 
2d 110, 262 P.2d 748 ( 1953), the Utah Supreme Court 
unanimously held that Rule 14 does not apply to a 
negligence case where the original defendant at-
tempts to shift the blame over to a third party. In the 
Hardman case the defendants were the drivers and 
OV\'ners of an automobile which collided with a car 
in which the plaintiffs were riding as passengers. 
\Vhen the plaintiffs brought the suit against the 
uefendants, the defendants sought to interplead the 
owner and driver of the car in which the plaintiffs 
were riding as passengers. The defendants relied on 
Rule 14 to justify the joinder claiming that the hosts 
\Vere the sole cause of the injuries or at least a con-
tributing cause. They reasoned that such being the 
case they were entitled to have the court find the hosts 
were liable to the plaintiffs for their injuries and that 
the defendants were not. The Supreme Court held 
that Rule 14 was not applicable in such a situation 
and said in part: 
"If the negligence of the interpleaded parties 
was the sole and proximate cause of the in-
juries as defendants maintain, the latter would 
have a complete defense to the action without 
the joinder." 
In the instant case, the Upper Canal Company filed 
its answer alleging as an affirmative defense that Salt 
Lake County was solely liable for any damage the 
plaintiffs may have sustained. [R.11 J As pointed out 
in Hardman, if the Upper Canal can prove this 
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<lefense, then it has a complete defense to the 
action of the original plaintiffs and there is no need 
for the joinder. 
The court stated m Hardman that if the third-
party plaintiffs were alleging that the third-party 
defendants were concurrently or jointly negligent 
with them, then the joinder would avail the third-
party plaintiffs nothing since contribution cannot be 
had between joint or concurrent tort-feasors unless 
sanctioned by statute, there being none such in Utah. 
Similarily in the instant case it appears clear that the 
Upper Canal is alleging that either ( 1) Salt Lakr 
County is solely and completely liable for any dam-
ages which the plaintiffs have sustained; in which 
case the Upper Canal would have a complete defense 
to the action as stated in Hardman supra; or (2) the 
Upper Canal Company is alleging that Salt Lake 
County is in some way concurrently or jointly liable 
with them in the damages which the plaintiffs have 
sustained. Point ( 2) follows because of the three ( 3 J 
original grounds of negligence alleged by the plain-
tiffs, Cohvells, only the third ground is raised against 
Salt Lake County-that too much 'Nater had been 
allowed in the canal. Clearly Salt Lake County had 
nothing to do with the construction or maintenance 
of the canal vvhich are the substance of the other two 
grounds of negligence. However, Salt Lake County 
canont be held li<l hle to tht' Upper Canal as a joint 
tort-feasor since there is no contribution among joi11t 
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tort-feasors in Utah. To the same effect see 3 Moore's 
Federal Practice 571 et sequel §14.11 "Impleader of 
Joint Tort-Feasor." 
In its amended third-party complaint, the Upper 
Canal Company seeks to hold Salt Lake County and 
the individual commissioners liable for money dam-
ages. [ R.35 J This is based upon the allegations in 
the said amended complaint to the effect that Salt 
Laek County was engaged in storm drainage and 
flood control activities resulting in the construction 
of pipelines, hard-surfaced streets, etc. which carried 
an excess amount of water into the plaintiff's canal 
facilities. Such activities by the county are govern-
mental in nature and this court has repeatedly held 
that under similar circumstances damages cannot be 
avvarded. [Frank 0. Reeder v. Brigham City, 17 
U.2d 398, 413 P.2d C1966); State v. Wilkinson, 42 
Utah 483 ( 1913); Hurst v. Highway Department of 
the State of Utah, 16 U.2d 153, 397 P.2d 71 ( 1964); 
Richard P. Hampton and Patricia L. Hampton v. State 
of Utah by and through its Road Commission, 21 U.2d 
708, 445 P.2d 708 C 19688. J Furthermore, there are 
110 ;1llcgations of any malice, fraud, gross negligence 
or the like 011 the part of the individual third-party 
df'fE:'ndants as Commissioners of Salt Lake County and 
consequently the instant case was properly dismissed 
as to them. r Salt Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 
4.fi2, 117 Pac.1075.J 
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The amended third-party complaint is also de-
fective because it does not contain any allegations that 
the Upper Canal Company has complied with the pro-
visions of Utah's governmental immunity act requir-
ing the presentation of a notice of claim as a condi-
tion precedent to filing suit against the county or its 
officers. 
Section 63-30-13 UCA-1953 as amended in 1965 
reads as follows: 
"63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision 
... a claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety (90) days after the cause of 
action arises .... " 
There is no allegation in the amended third-party 
complaint that any notice has been filed with Salt 
Lake County within ninety (90) days after the cause 
of action arose. This may have been one of the 
reasons why the original plaintiffs did not join Salt 
Lake County as a defendant. 
SUMMARY 
For the reasons set forth above, the third-party 
defendants submit that the ruling of the trial judge 
allowing the Upper Canal Company to file its third-
party cornplaiut is etT011eous and thal the motion of 
the said. thinl-port)' dPfendm1ts to dismiss the corn-
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plaint should be granted. The plaintiffs, Colwells, 
did not think it advisable to name Salt Lake County 
as a defendant and the Upper Canal Company has 
shown no basis for doing so. Rule 14 has application 
to contract actions; but its operation to tort actions 
as in the instant case has been restricted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Hardman case, supra. 
Respectfully submitted 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants 
15 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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